Il y a toujours un déséquilibre des forces en jeu

Commençons avec l'essentiel. Les investisseurs individuels sont de petits joueurs dans des marchés financiers qui sont tous dominés par les grands investisseurs. Quand un petit investisseur transige, il y a de fortes chances qu’un grand investisseur ou négociant (en anglais, trader) ayant des moyens sophistiqués de négociation est de l'autre côté de la transaction. Quelles sont les implications?

Soyez réaliste, et ne cherchez pas à faire de l'argent grâce à des transactions fréquentes ou en achetant les actions dernière tendance de l’année. Voici ce que le site américain  BusineesInsider.com propose:

Investor confidence built on the idea that regulators can create a level playing field is no better than a con game. Instead of trying to foster investor confidence around this phony notion, the Securities and Exchanfe Commission should sanction anyone they find fooling investors into believing it. The truth is that the ordinary, retail investor is like the high school JV team playing against the New York Giants. You don't stand a chance if you try to beat them at their game of stock picking, forecasting and market timing. Business Insider ou en  PDF doc.1988.

ET:

The small amateur investor who reads Barrons on the weekends, this story goes, should be able to go toe-to-toe with full-time professionals with decades of experience, multi-million-dollar research budgets, and global trading operations. The fact that this story isn't always laughed out of town says pretty much all you need to know about the state of investment expertise in this country. Business Insider2 ou en PDF doc.1987.

Eliott Spitzer , ancien Procureur général de l’état de New York et adversaire coriace à l’époque de Wall Street dit sensiblement la même chose:

Spitzer says the new insider trading probes illustrate how the game is tilted against small investors.
"If you are sitting there in front of a screen, thinking your information is going to be good enough to make smart judgments that will permit you to outperform the hundreds of thousands of people on Wall Street who have access to better information and more timely information than you, you're mistaken," Spitzer says. Beck Condon Huffington Post ou en PDF doc.1984

La législation en valeurs mobilières, les négociants et les investisseurs

Alors, quel est le lien entre minimiser la fréquence de vos transactions en valeurs mobilières et les délits d'initiés?

Un professeur américain de droit, Henry Manne, dans les années 1960 dans un livre célèbre a proposé que les délits d'initiés soient légalisés. Sa position n'a jamais été retenue. Mais il est intéressant de noter que sa position était fondée sur sa conviction que les délits d'initiés nuisaient seulement aux négociants à court terme, et non pas aux investisseurs à long terme.

By and large the idea that there is no direct harm from the practice has held up very well, especially the point that no real damage is caused to an investor who engages anonymously on an exchange in a trade with an insider on the other side of the transaction. However, one “harm” argument of feasible merit4 has dominated the academic literature for some time. This is the so-called “adverse selection” argument. Basically the argument is that, since specialists on the floor of stock exchanges (or other market makers) systematically lose money when insiders are trading, they will expand their bid-ask spread in order to cover this greater cost of doing business. In this fashion, it is argued, they pass along the cost of insiders’ trading to all outside investors with whom they deal, the so-called “insider trading tax.”5
The first part of this argument is really just a variant of the idea in my book that short-term traders would indeed frequently lose to insiders6 (a warning against using the stock market as a gambling casino). I suggested that long-term investors7 had little to worry about quantitatively because of insider trading, and the same thing remains true regardless of the existence of some adverse selection. Manne 2005 ou en PDF doc.1990.

Mais les autorités en valeurs mobilières et presque tous les universitaires ont rejeté sa position, en prétextant que même les négociants à court terme méritaient une protection légale:

But these considerations of long-term investors and pricing efficiency neglect important considerations of equity and justice. First, with respect to long-term investors, they presumably are not harmed because assuming that they focus their attention on the long-term is just a way of assuming that they are not the ones who trade with the privileged insider. Over the long-term, prices would move to a new equilibrium that reflects the insider’s information when that informationeventually becomes public. So the status of long-term investors is not particularly interesting in this connection, since they are the least affected and there is no reason to privilege long-term investors over those who happen to be trading now. Kolb 2007 Risk Management and Distributive Justice ou en PDF doc.1901.

<< Début < Précédente 1 2 3 Suivante > Fin >>